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Abstract 
The hypothesis that companies substitute trade credit for bank credit during period of 
restricted monetary policy has been subject of empirical investigation for the reasons 
that it helps us to understand the linkages between the financial sector and real sector 
of economy.  This paper examines whether companies in India substitute trade credit 
for bank credit during restricted monetary policy years.  Using panel data econometric 
method the study uses time-series cross-section company level data of 828 
manufacturing companies covering period from 1990 to 2001.  The findings suggest 
that the magnitude of substitution of trade credit for bank credit is statistically 
significant during the monetary restrictive years.  These results assume significance as 
about 40 per cent and 30 per cent of current assts constitute the trade credit and bank 
credit respectively.  Both these put together is about 35 per cent of total asset of sample 
companies in India.  The results also suggest that magnitude of substitution vary 
depending on the size of company. 
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1.  Introduction 
Companies use various short-term financing sources to meet their working capital 
requirements.  Trade credit and bank borrowings under cash-credit systems are two 
important sources of finance to meet working capital requirements of companies in 
India.  These two sources account for about 35 per cent of total assets and 70 per cent 
of total current assets of companies in India.  The bank borrowing and trade credit as 
percent of current assets are about 30 per cent and 40 per cent respectively.  These two 
items represent the bulk of the total short-term borrowing accounting for about 93 per 
cent.  Given the significance of these two sources in company’s financial structure their 
mix assumes critical significant.  The companies would be using these sources 
depending on their costs, flexibility and timing.  The macro-economic factors such as 
interest rates and money supply/credit conditions are likely to have significant impact 
on the composition, mix and pattern of these sources of funding.  One area of research, 
which has received attention, has been whether companies substitute trade credit for 
bank credit during monetary policy restrictive years. 
The hypothesis that companies substitute trade credit for bank credit during period of 
restricted monetary policy has been subject of empirical investigation for the reasons 
that it helps us to understand the linkages between the financial sector and real sector 
of economy.  Two specific thoughts have emerged in this area.  These are: money 
channel and credit channel.  Money channel or interest rate channel argument suggests 
that financial sector is irrelevant.  Monetary policy restrictions are transmitted to the 
real sector through the increase in cost of capital affecting the cost sensitive spending 
and thereby slowing down the economic activity.   
On the other hand, credit channel proponents challenge this and suggest that credit 
plays important role in propagation or mitigation of monetary shocks into the real 
economy (Bernanke and Gertler 1995).  There are two hypotheses proposed to explain 
the credit channel.  These are broad credit channel and bank lending channel.  Broad 
credit channel suggest that given imperfections in credit market, information 
asymmetry problem between lenders and borrowers may amplify the policy-induced   5
impact (Oliner and Rudebusch 1996). This view argues that rise in interest rates 
followed by a monetary policy contraction reduces the value of collateral of 
companies, raising the cost of the external finance premium of all sources of finance. 
As external finance of all types becomes more costly, companies having lesser internal 
resources are likely to be affected most adversely by the tightening of monetary policy.  
Therefore the use of trade credit goes up during the period of restrictive monetary 
policy - when the supply of and the demand for bank credit declines, and decrease in 
the liberal monetary policy period - when companies make greater use of bank credit 
due to falling interest rates.   
The bank lending channel suggests that during restricted monetary policy bank lending 
goes down and as a result companies substitute trade credit for bank credit to meet 
some of their financial requirements (Meltzer 1960, Bernanke and Blinder 1988, 
Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox 1993).  This view argues that banks reduce their supply of 
loans during monetary policy contraction, and bank dependent companies 
experiencing financial constraint have to cut down on their inventory levels and may 
be other investments and obligations such as dividend payment.  Pandey and Bhat 
(2004) find that monetary policy restrictions do have impact on cost of raising funds, 
and the information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers increases that forces 
companies to reduce their dividend payout.  However, this may disproportionately 
affects smaller companies and other companies that do not have access to credit 
markets.  
Companies which have access to trade credit are likely to substitute this for bank credit 
during periods of monetary policy tightening (Meltzer 1960).  In some sense the 
availability of trade credit may soften the impact of monetary policy tightening on 
companies having access to this source. However, bank-dependent companies not 
having access to other sources of financing may have to cut back on their inventory 
holdings if access to trade credit is not available. The paper makes an attempt to study 
whether the bank lending channel work in Indian situation by studying the use of 
trade credit in response to changes in the monetary policy environment.  The findings   6
of this paper will help us to understand the impact of macro-economic factors on the 
composition and mix of these two sources of finance.  Specifically the paper examines 
the trade credit–bank credit substitution hypothesis during monetary policy 
transmission in context of India by examining panel data of manufacturing companies. 
The present study focuses on two questions:  
·  Do companies in India use more trade credit during monetary policy restrictive 
years than in normal years and whether they substitute trade credit for bank 
credit?  
·  Does the size of company matter?  Do monetary policy restrictions affect all 
companies in same way?  Is the inventory of bank-dependent companies more 
sensitive to the extent to which they can avail trade credit, as compared to other 
companies having greater internal resources and easier access to other sources of 
finance? 
2.  Theories of monetary policy transmission 
There are various schools of thought regarding the channel of monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. These can be divided into two categories: 
·  money channel or interest rate channel 
·  credit channel 
Money channel 
According to the traditional ‘money view’ monetary policy affects output through the 
interest channel. The interest rate channel or the money channel of monetary policy 
transmission argues that as a result of a fall in money supply the real interest rates go 
up and therefore result in increase in the cost of capital (ko).  This forces companies to 
cut down on their investment levels. Besides, rise in interest rates also leads to a decline 
in aggregate demand as the benefits from savings increase. This consequently brings 
about a fall in output.  The IS-LM framework supports the traditional ‘money channel 
or interest channel view’, which holds that interest rates work as a mechanism during   7
monetary policy transmission, a rise or fall has a direct impact on the aggregate output. 
Interest rates thus have a direct effect on the IS curve, which shows the positions at 
which investment equal savings, and LM curve, which shows positions at which the 
demand for money (suggesting liquidity preference) equals money supply, that 
determine the equilibrium values of output. 
Credit channel 
Other authors argue about the existence of the credit channel of monetary policy.  This 
is based on the assumption that tight monetary policy directly restricts the availability 
of credit to companies.  There are two views regarding how the credit channel brings 
about a monetary policy transmission.  One view holds that it is through broad credit 
channel of monetary policy transmission and second it is through bank lending channel.  
These are discussed in following sections. 
Broad credit channel 
While the bank-lending channel of monetary policy affects bank credit on the supply 
side by reducing the supply of bank loans, the broad credit channel operates through 
the demand side of credit. Proponents of the broad credit channel argue that a rise in 
the bank lending rate arising due to shrinkage in loan supply increases not only the 
interest rates of banks but also the cost of external finance for companies. As a result of 
higher interest rates the retained profits of companies reduce.  This in turn affects the 
value of collateral offered by companies and forces cost of external finance to increase.  
This makes borrowing expensive and hence lowers the demand not only for bank 
loans but for all types of external finance.  Thus, monetary policy transmission may 
take place through the broad credit channel, where a rise in interest rates weakens the 
balance sheets of borrowers (therefore this is also known as balance sheet channel) 
which in turn reduce the overall credit available to companies in general, and not bank 
lending in particular (Oliner and Rudebusch 1996).  The researchers have also argued 
that tightening of monetary policy is likely to affect small companies more adversely 
than large companies (Oliner and Rudebusch 1996 and Blasio 2003).   8
On demand side interventions the bank sometimes may not necessarily use interest 
rates as a mechanism to meet demand and supply gaps in credit market but use credit 
rationing approach.  It is well predicted that asymmetric information between the 
lender and the borrower does not allow banks to distinguish between good and bad 
borrowers. A rise in interest rates as a response to tightening of monetary policy would 
drive away good borrowers having positive net present value projects and would 
attract marginal borrowers with risky and negative net present value projects, thus 
increasing the risk of default and lowering the expected profits of banks. Hence, banks 
choose not to raise interest rates but instead opt for credit rationing, where the total 
amount of loan granted to borrowers is curtailed. 
In recent years there has been growing interest in developing framework to understand 
the impact of impact of macro-economic variables on financing decisions of companies.  
The monetary policy through its impact on interest rates has been one important areas 
of investigation to study these impacts.  This transmission of this impact assumes 
greater significance in the presence of information asymmetry between borrowers and 
lenders.  In providing finances, the providers of all types of external finance will charge 
some premium over and above the cost of finance in comparison to the cost of internal 
funds (Gertler 1988).  In the presence of information asymmetry lenders will be 
incurring costs in evaluating projects, monitoring and enforcing outcomes.  The 
premium is required to compensate the providers for these costs.  Oliner and 
Rudebusch (1996) describe the relationship between information asymmetry and 
financing costs using Figure 1.  Given a company where F is the amount of internal 
funds available, its resulting cost of funds schedule is shown by S1.  The cost of these 
internal funds is r1 which can be decomposed into risk free rate (rf ) and risk premium 
(φ).  The risk-free rate (rf) can be treated as an outcome of monetary policy 
instruments.  The risk premium φ is risk adjusted for the company under 
consideration.  When the investment requirements exceed internal generated funds and 
assuming capital markets are perfect, external generated funds are also available at r1 
rate.  However, in the presence of information asymmetry between borrowers and 
lenders, there are more chances of company defaulting on its debt to outsiders because   9
of moral hazard problem - a predictable outcome of information asymmetry problem.  
This explains the shape of S1 why it rises beyond F.  The difference between r1 and 
actual cost of borrowing would be the premium for this moral hazard risk.  This 
premium will increase with the level of borrowing, as more debt will intensify the 
moral hazard problem.  This link between the premium and borrowing produces the 
upward slope of S1 curve.   
r1
r2











Figure 1 (adapted from Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) 
Changes in risk-free rate can also produce upward shift in the curve.  This is because 
the increase in risk-free rate will lower down the discounted value of borrower’s 
collateral, thereby increasing moral hazard problem.  The dependence of this premium 
on risk-free rate produces linkages with the macro-economic policies.  For example, 
monetary policy changes can produce changes in risk-free rate.  With the increase in 
this rate because of monetary policy restrictions, the cost of funds will go up and there 
would be upward shift from S1 to S2 curve.  This rise in cost of funds would have 
implications for the investments which fall from I1 to I2.  Capital market imperfections 
magnify any macroeconomic shocks that affect borrowers’ moral hazard (Stiglitz 
1992). This is the reason why new supply schedule is S2 and not S΄1.  The restrictive 
monetary policy intensifies the effect on cost of debt and external financing by pushing 
it up and increasing the spread at various levels of financial requirements.  The theory   10
predicts that with the change in macro-economic policy which results in increase in 
risk-free rate, the cost of funds will go up and thereby reduce the availability of funds 
for proposed investment requirements. 
Bank lending channel 
The bank lending channel is based on premise that bank loans assume significant 
importance in monetary transmission mechanism.  Proponents of the bank lending 
channel argue that restrictive monetary policy brings about a reduction in the overall 
supply of bank loans.  For example, the purchasing of securities through open market 
operations to influence money supply affects the cash reserves of banks by the same 
amount.  The balance sheet equation of banks is such that cash reserves plus securities 
plus loans (assets side) equals to demand deposits and time deposits (liabilities side).  The 
demand deposits are subject to cash reserve requirements.   Hence, monetary tightening 
compels the bank to reduce the proportion of demand deposits if cash reserve goes 
down.  Since the adjustment on liabilities side (demand deposits and time deposits) of 
the balance sheet is not possible to meet these requirements in short-run, the cash 
reserves are maintained by reducing either loans or securities.  Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988) have used an expansion of conventional IS-LM framework to explain this by 
including the impact of bank lending rate as a complementary mechanism that 
strengthens the direct interest rate effects. They argue that two conditions need to be 
satisfied for the bank lending channel to exist. Not only should loans and securities be 
imperfect substitutes in bank portfolios, loans and securities should also be seen as 
imperfect substitutes for borrowers.  The securities and loans are not perfects 
substitutes of each other because the credit risks associated with the loans may give rise 
to liquidity problem in future and, therefore, the two are not seen as perfect 
substitutes.  As discussed earlier the banks prefer to ration loans to meet the 
requirement of the contraction in monetary policy and explain why a reduction in 
bank reserves causes a reduction in the supply of loans by banks.  When the bank 
lending goes down companies explore alternative options for meeting their financial 
requirements.  Trade credit is one such source.   11
Why trade credit is important? 
Trade credit is an important source of financing the operations of a business whether 
there is or there is no monetary restriction in the system.  There are several theories 
which have been put forward to explain the use and availability of trade credit as a 
source of finance. Petersen and Rajan (1996) divide these explanations into three broad 
categories.  These are: 
1.  Financing advantage of trade credit 
2.  Price discrimination through trade credit 
3.  Transactions costs explanation 
 
The financing advantage theory is based on premise that supplier in comparison to 
traditional lenders would be relatively in better position to assess credit worthiness of 
his client.  They are also in better position to monitor and ensure recovery.  This 
produces cost advantage and this is because of three reasons: advantage in information 
acquisition about business and its timing at lower costs, better control on buyer 
behaviour through stipulating various conditions and influencing the availability of 
goods thereby ability to affect operations and better capacity to recover value based on 
collateral (Petersen and Rajan 1996).  In comparison to these the financial institutions 
and banks would have less flexibility in these areas. 
The other reason for existence of trade is because of its use as a mechanism to 
discriminate on price.  Trade credit reduces the effective price to low quality 
borrowers.  In a highly price elastic market, this may be quite critical.  Many times 
producers would like to increase the sales, credit becomes an important instrument.  
When the producers see the seller as part of their distribution network and has long-
term interest in ensuring that the buyer survives, the suppler even in risky case may 
extend the credit.  In these situations the seller is taking into account the long-term 
discounted value of all future profits which would accrue to supplier.  Petersen and 
Rajan (1996) suggest this is the value of supplier’s implicit equity stake in buyer’s 
business and therefore for this the seller offers short-term financing support.   12
Transaction cost theory suggests that trade credit helps in reducing the transaction 
costs of reducing the bills (Ferris 1981).  Rather than paying the bills every time the 
buyers places an order and goods are delivered, the buyer develops a system of collating 
these payments and paying them once in a month or once in a quarter.  The payment 
cycle is separated from delivery schedule to reduce transaction costs.   Particularly in 
situations where businesses are subject to seasonalities in demand and production, the 
trade credit is an effective way to reduce the financing costs in holding the inventories 
(by receiving the trade credit) as well as reducing the storing costs (by giving credit)  
without affecting prices. 
However, during the monetary restrictions the use of trade credit assumes more 
significance.  Based on the above arguments the bank credit and trade credit 
substitution is explained in Figure 2.  After monetary policy restrictions the cost of 
external finances (including bank credit) relative to internal funds increases.  This shift 
in relative finance costs causes shifts in investments.   
r1
r2














The amount of investments would be subject to availability of internal funds and will 
be sensitive to such changes after monetary policy restrictions.  As a result of this to 
ensure availability of funds companies may depend more on trade credit to meet the   13
investment requirements in inventories.  Under capital market imperfections, the effect 
of restrictive monetary policy would be significant than during normal times.  Pandey 
and Bhat (2004) provide evidence that Indian companies reduce their dividend payout 
to augment internal resources to meet their requirements during monetary policy 
restrictions.  As a result by augmenting these resources there would be shift in 
availability from F to F΄ thereby increasing availability of funds from I2 (from Figure 1) 
to I΄2 (in Figure 2).  The amount of investment I΄2 is greater than I2 by the amount 
difference in F΄ and F which results because of the higher use of trade credit under 
monetary restrictive years.  The empirical results presented in this paper provide 
evidence whether the macro-economy variables have any influence on use of trade 
credit. 
Bernake and Gertler (1995) argue that it is difficult to separate the money channel from 
broad credit channel; rather they should be seen as complementary to each other. They 
argue for the existence of a credit channel in general that strengthens the interest effects 
of monetary transmission mechanism.  Empirically it is also difficult to confirm the 
existence of the bank lending channel as bank lending is influenced both by demand 
for as well as supply of the same.  Nevertheless, some authors have attempted to 
distinguish the demand and supply side factors affecting bank lending, by comparing 
the behaviour of the change in the ratio of bank loans to non-bank borrowings, which 
is expected to be low if companies substitute bank loans for other alternative sources of 
financing. This is based on the hypothesis that if banks restrict credit, companies 
would be forced to use alternative finance sources. 
3.  Empirical research  
A number of studies have attempted to examine the credit channel of monetary policy 
transmission by testing the impact of monetary policy on the behaviour of short-term 
as well as long-term sources of financing of companies.  The empirical findings are mix.  
There are studies which find empirical support of the bank lending channel, and other 
studies claim about the existence of a broad credit channel that affects the financing and 
investment pattern of companies.  At the same time there are studies which find no   14
conclusive evidence about the existence of a credit channel for monetary policy 
transmission.  We review some of these studies in this section. 
Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) test the bank lending channel by examining the 
changes in the composition of bank loans versus commercial paper and find that 
following monetary contractions, companies in aggregate increase their borrowing 
form the commercial paper market relative to borrowing from banks. 
Oliner and Rudebusch (1995) raise questions about the approach used in the model of  
Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) as it only investigates changes in the bank credit-
commercial paper mix and ignores other types of non-bank financing.  Besides they 
point out that their findings are based on aggregate data which does not account for the 
shift in credit from small companies to large companies. They point out that the 
financing patterns should be studied separately for companies of different sizes as large-
sized companies are less bank-dependent and may have wider access to other sources of 
finance as compared to small-sized companies. Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) also point 
out that small-sized companies do not have access to the commercial paper market.  
Nilsen (1999) suggest that out all types of companies, including those not having access 
to commercial paper may have access to trade credit during monetary contractions.  By 
studying changes in financing mix separately for small and large companies, Oliner and 
Rudebusch (1996) find no alteration in the proportion of bank-debt to other debt 
following monetary contractions. Their study finds significant impact on shift of bank 
credit from small-sized companies to large-sized companies and also a significant 
decline in all types of credit for small-sized companies, which is consistent with the 
broad credit channel view of monetary policy. 
The broad credit channel assigns importance to internal funds as all types of external 
financing becomes costly following monetary contractions. The link between internal 
funds and capital spending is expected to strengthen during monetary tightening. 
Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994) observe strong correlation between internal 
liquidity and change in inventories when they use the inventory investment model   15
including the liquidity variable to measure the impact of changes in monetary policy 
on the sample companies. Their argument is based on Meltzer’s hypothesis (1960) that 
credit constrained companies are likely to increase their use of trade credit. Using 
percentage of trade credit paid late and the amount of trade credit discounts foregone 
to indicate the demand for trade credit, Peterson and Rajan (1997) find that credit 
rationed companies, whose loan applications have been denied by banks, increase their 
use of trade credit.  These studies suggest that ignoring the use of trade credit as a 
financing alternative will not give a true picture of the financial constraints faced by 
companies after monetary contractions.  Nilsen (1999) examines the trade credit 
behavior of small and large companies following monetary contractions, and find that 
all types of companies irrespective of size increase their use of trade credit following 
monetary policy restrictions.  Using bond ratings as an indicator of capital market 
access, they find that larger companies with a bond rating do not increase their use of 
trade credit during such periods. Their results support the bank lending channel of 
monetary policy transmission, where companies not having access to bank loans as a 
result of reduction in its supply, finance their investments with trade credit. when 
monetary policy tightens. 
Guido de Blasio (2003) examine a panel of 3862 companies in the Italian manufacturing 
sector over a period of 18 years where 5 significant monetary contraction episodes took 
place for testing the trade credit and bank finance substitution hypothesis and find the 
substitution effect is quite modest.  Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994) use the standard 
inventory model augmented by the liquidity variable for measuring the impact of 
monetary tightening on companies with the assumption that internal resources of the 
company matter the most when bank credit declines, and hence expect a strong 
correlation between liquidity and investment during periods of monetary contraction. 
Guido de Blasio (2003) argue that trade credit cannot be ignored as it can be used to 
substitute bank finance, and hence liquidity alone cannot capture the financial 
constraint faced by companies. In order to examine the net impact of monetary 
restriction they include the measures of liquidity and trade credit along with 
interaction terms for monetary policy contraction years that capture the effect of   16
monetary policy on the trade credit and bank credit substitution in their standard 
inventory model. 
4.  Methodology and data 
Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994) include liquidity variable in standard inventory 
model for testing the bank-lending channel of monetary policy transmission.  Based on 
the production smoothing and buffer-stock arguments of Lovell (1961), their study uses 
the following model: 
∆ Log (INVi,t) = λ0 + λ1 Log (INVi ,t-1/Si ,t-1) + λ2 ∆ Log (Si,t) + λ3 ∆ Log (Si,t-1) + λ4 LIQt- + εi,t  
where INV is inventory, S is sales LIQ denotes cash plus marketable securities as ratio 
of total assets.  Variables INV/S and S are to control for the non-financial determinants 
of inventories, where these denote start of the period inventory to sales ratio, growth 
in sales for last two periods to capture the effect of backlog of unfulfilled orders. LIQ 
has been defined at the beginning of the period. A positive significant coefficient of 
liquidity variables is viewed as evidence that liquidity constraints reduce the inventory 
investment. The other control variables also included industry dummies.   
The model expects the coefficient of LIQ to be positive, suggesting that companies not 
having sufficient internal resources will have to cut down on their investment during 
monetary policy tightening.  Alternative specification of this model also included 
interaction variables such as LIQ*B where B represents bond market access dummy 
which takes a value of 1 for companies having credit market ratings and 0 otherwise. 
Adding the variable is based on the premise that companies with B=0 are bank-
dependent and they are likely to have stronger correlations between liquidity and 
investment during monetary policy tightening, as compared to B=1 companies.  The 
model expects the coefficient for LIQ*B to be zero, suggesting that companies with a 
bond rating are not likely to have liquidity problems as they have access to other 
sources of finance during monetary contractions.  Besides, the authors also run their   17
model augmented by the liquidity variable separately for companies with bond rating 
and companies without bond rating. 
As discussed in previous sections, the access to and availability of trade credit is likely 
to play an important role.  The above model has been augmented by including the 
variable for trade credit by Guido de Blasio (2003) as follows: 
∆ Log (INVi,t)=λ0+λ1Log (INVi ,t-1/Si ,t-1)+λ2 ∆ Log (Si,t)+λ3 ∆ Log (Si,t-1)+λ4 LIQi,t-1+λ5 TCi,t-1+εi,t 
The author argues that tight monetary conditions are not only likely to intensify the 
correlations between liquidity and inventory investment for bank dependent 
companies, but also between trade credit and inventory investment, which is used as an 
alternative mode for financing during restrictive monetary periods. Hence the model is 
modified to include the trade credit along with the liquidity variable. Besides, these two 
variables are interacted with the monetary restriction dummy variable. The monetary 
restriction (MR) dummy variable takes the value of 1 in tight monetary years and 0 
otherwise. 
The model used in the present study is based on the models used by Kashyap, Lamont 
and Stein (1994) and Guido de Blasio (2003).  We have used both LIQ and TC variables 
in specifying our model.  The final model also includes interaction terms.  We also 
include size and growth variables to control for company specific characteristics.  
These are total assets and growth in total assets.  Finally we have used the following 
model in this study: 
∆ Log (INVt) = λ0 + λ1 Log (INVi ,t-1/Si ,t-1) + λ2 ∆ Log (Si,t) + λ3 LIQi,t-1 + λ4 TCi,t-1 + λ5  MRt* TCi,t-1 
+ λ6 MRt* LIQi,t-1 + λ7 ∆ Log (TAi,t-1) + λ8 Log (TAi,t-1) + φi + θt+ εi,t 
where the dependent variable is the change in the log of inventories at the end of the 
year, Independent variables include log of inventory-sales ratio in the beginning of the 
year, change in the log of sales in the current year i.e., growth in sales, LIQ (cash and 
marketable securities divided by total assets in the beginning of the period), TC (trade   18
credit divided by short-term borrowings, where short-term borrowings include trade 
credit, commercial paper, short-term bank borrowings and other short-term 
borrowings). The other variables included in the model estimation are Log (TAi,t-1) and 
∆ Log (TAi,t-1) to indicate size and growth variables for control.  We run the final 
model including the interaction terms where LIQ and TC variables interacted with 
monetary restriction period dummy variable (MR). MR takes value of 1 in 1991 and 
1996, and 0 in the other years (see Appendix 1). 





Effect of monetary policy 
Not positive  Not positive  No evidence of credit rationing 
Positive  Not positive  Evidence of credit rationing but not trade 
credit rationing and no evidence for the 
substitution hypothesis 
Positive  Positive  Evidence in favour of substitution hypothesis 
Not positive  Positive  Strong evidence in favour of substitution 
hypothesis since what seems to really matter is 
the company’s access to TC during monetary 
policy tightening 
 
Our estimation model uses panel data estimation method.  Panel estimation is 
considered superior because it explicitly takes into account the heterogeneity of sample 
of companies.  Panel data allows controlling for unobservable heterogeneity through 
individual (company) effect (ϕi) and temporal effect (φt) by including dummies for time 
variable.  Since the sample contains cross-section of companies belonging to different 
industries there is bound to be some heterogeneity.  This also helps in controlling the 
general effect of all other macro-economic variables. Pooling of time-series cross-
sectional data provides more observations, more variability, less collinearity among 
variables, more degree of freedom and more efficiency (Baltagi 1995). More 
importantly, pooled data are more proficient to identify and measure effects that are   19
undetectable in pure cross-section or pure time-series data. Moreover, the measurement 
biases resulting from aggregation over firms or individuals and biases arising from 
omitted-variables are reduced (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998, p.250). The merit of a 
panel data over cross-section data is the ease of modelling the differences in behaviour 
across individuals (Greene 2003). Moreover, it is only through the cross-section time-
series analysis it is possible to examine the effect of monetary policy restrictions of 
several years and the dynamics of change is studied effectively.   
Data  
We have used Prowess Database and our sample includes all companies in the 
manufacturing sector for which annualised data for all years beginning from 1990 to 
2001 is available.  The initial sample contained 937 companies.  The sample excludes all 
companies for which average net sales is less than ten crores over the 1990-2001 period. 
This reduced our sample size to 893 companies.  Data for companies with accounting 
year ending in any month during October t-1 to September t has been considered 
belonging to year t.  Because of change in accounting year and process of annualising 
the data, some companies have missing data in more than one year.  Companies with 
missing data for two or more consecutive years have also been excluded from the 
sample. The final sample consists of 828 companies. There are some companies for 
which the value of financial variable is equal to zero in some years.  Wherever these 
variables were used to compute the growth, their value was set to 0.01 to facilitate the 
computation and use of that observation in regression equation. 
For the purpose of monetary policy restrictions the study uses the Reserve Bank of 
India’s Economic Survey Reports as a base to identify the restrictive years.  There are 
two monetary policy restrictive years viz., 1991-92 and 1996-97 during the sample 
period of the study.  According to the Economic Survey of 1992 the monetary policy 
in 1991-92 was highly restrictive for the reasons of containing the growth of aggregate 
demand to fight the twin problems of high inflation and adverse balance of payments. 
Further, the Economic Survey of 1997 states that during 1996-1997 the bank lending 
rates remained sticky for sometime despite the increased liquidity with the banks   20
following cash credit ratio (CRR) reductions. Banks did not reduce interest rates 
immediately in order to avoid a dent in the interest rate spread that would have 
affected profits adversely. With inflation falling sharply, real interest rates rose, 
contributing to lower demand for credit.  Though nominal interest rates fell during the 
1996-97 period, real interest rates rose during this period because of falling inflation 
rates.  The period of 1996-97 has also been described as restrictive year (see Appendix 
1). 
5.  Findings 
Table 1 provides important statistics of sample companies’ financial variables used in 
the study.  Table 2 gives the amounts of various components of borrowings in crores 
of rupees for the years included in the study.  The sources included here are total bank 
borrowings (TBB), borrowings by financial institutions (FI), commercial paper and 
fixed deposits (CPFD), borrowings from debentures (DEB), foreign borrowings 
(FOR), borrowings from other group and non-group companies and borrowings from 
promoters (PR), other borrowings (OTHER) and trade credit (TC).  These are also 
shown as percentage of the total long term and short term borrowings including trade 
credit in Tables 3 to 6.  Along with the borrowings figures we have also included 
inventories (INV) and accounts receivable (AR) and have shown them as percent of the 
sum of inventories plus accounts receivable.  Table 4 shows STBB, CPFD, OTHER 
borrowings and TC as percentage of total short term borrowings (STB) which the sum 
of these four short term borrowing components.  Tables 5 and 6 show these variables 
as percentage of total assets and as percentage of current assets respectively.  Tables 1 to 
3 indicate that total bank borrowing account for about 28 per cent of total borrowings 
and trade credit accounts for about 34 per cent of total borrowings.   These two sources 
account for about 62 per cent of total borrowings.  Both these financing sources play 
important role in meeting the working capital financing requirements for inventory 
and accounts receivables. Table 4 indicates that these two sources account for 92 per 
cent of short-term borrowings of companies in India.  Table 5 shows that short-term 
bank borrowings and trade credit as per cent of total assets account for about 14.5 per   21
cent and 19.5 per cent respectively.  These two sources account for about 34 per cent of 
total assets.   Inventory as per cent of total assets is about 25 per cent.  Table 6 shows 
that inventory and accounts receivables as per cent of current assets are 41 per cent and 
32 per cent respectively.  Short-term bank borrowings and trade credit finance is about 
60 per cent of current assets and finance about 82 per cent of inventory and accounts 
receivables requirements. 
Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in estimating the regression 
equations.  Table 8 give the correlation matrix of variables used in the study.   
We estimate the base model using OLS method without explicitly including the 
variables of monetary policy restrictions.  Table 9 presents the year-wise OLS estimates 
of basic equations without incorporating the monetary policy restriction effect.  As 
expected that in the years 1991 and 1996 which are monetary policy restriction years 
the coefficient of TC is positive.  The estimated value of these coefficients is 0.0767 and 
0.0143 in 1991 and 1996 respectively.  In all other years this coefficient is negative.  The 
TC coefficient is positive only in years 1991 and 1996, which suggests that companies 
increased their dependence on trade credit during these years.  The results of pooled 
OLS are presented in Table 10.  The coefficients of MRt* TCi,t-1 is positive and 
significant at 1 per cent and coefficient of MRt* LIQi,t-1 is negative and significant at 1 
per cent suggesting strong substitution of trade credit for bank finance during 
restrictive monetary policy years.  In this equation we introduce trade credit and 
monetary restriction year interaction term.  However, we know that OLS estimates of 
pooled panel are not appropriate as it ignores the company and period effect.  
We use panel data fixed effect model and random effect model to estimate the equation.  
Tables 11 to 14 provide estimates of pooled panel data estimates based on fixed effect 
and random effect models.  We also test whether the fixed effect model or random 
effect model is appropriate in our situation.  While estimating the panel data equation 
we have included the monetary restriction interaction variables taking 1991 and 1996 as 
monetary policy restrictive years.  The monetary restriction period dummy variable,   22
denoted by MR assumes the value of 1 in 1991 and 1996 and the value of 0 in the rest 
of the years.  We estimate model which includes LIQ and TC interacting with the MR 
variable.   
The two-way fixed effect model that accounts for cross-sectional and time-specific 
effects is used for the purpose of the analysis, as it is more robust as compared to the 
one-way fixed effect model that does not account for time dummies. The fixed effect 
model which controls both for group and time is more robust, as compared to the 
other models. The Hausman specification test is significant at 1% level suggesting a 
preference for the fixed effect model over the random effects model. Table 14 report 
the results of the Hausman test.  
The summary results of various models are presented below: 
Estimation method  MR*LIQ  MR*TC 
OLS estimates  -0.521
* 0.233
* 
Fixed effect model (only group dummies)  -0.323
** 0.177
* 
Fixed effect model (group means regression)  -0.649  1.198
* 
Fixed effect model (group dummies and period effect)  -0.161  0.339
* 




Size effect (Fixed effect model with group  
dummies and period effects 
Size Group 1  -0.846
* 0.575
* 
Size Group 2  0.112  0.369
* 
Size Group 3  0.226  0.226
* 
Size Group 4  0.073  0.209
* 
Significance level: 
* 1 per cent, 
** 10 per cent 
 
The estimates of fixed effect model with group dummies and period effects indicate 
that the coefficient of MRt* TCi,t-1 is highly significant at 1 per cent with t-value of 
7.840 and positive coefficient of 0.3393 while the coefficient of MRt* LIQi,t-1 coefficient 
is not positive. This coefficient is not statistically significant.  The results provide 
strong evidence in favour of the substitution hypothesis, meaning that what matters 
more during monetary policy tightening is the company’s access to trade credit. 
Companies which are not able to get access to trade credit may have to cut down on   23
their inventory level.  Under all estimation methods the sign of TC*MR variable is 
positive and significant at 1 per cent level.   
We also estimate the sensitivity of monetary policy restriction to companies classified 
by net worth.  Previous studies have argued that restrictive monetary policy raises the 
external finance premium for all types of borrowing. During restrictive monetary 
policy periods, higher interest rates lower the cash balance of the companies, which has 
an adverse effect on the net worth of companies. Companies with high net worth are 
expected to bear a higher external finance premium.  Monetary policy restriction 
further accentuates the problem for companies with low net worth which are expected 
to have a high cost of external financing. Further, the external finance premium is 
expected to be higher for the low net worth companies, such companies are expected 
to be more liquidity constrained, and are expected to rely more on trade credit during 
monetary restriction periods. Hence, the coefficient of the MRt*TCi,t-1 variable is 
expected to be higher for companies with low net worth.  
The companies are classified into four categories based on their quartile net worth. 
Table 15 provides the results of the two-way fixed effects with group dummies and 
period effects for companies classified by net worth. It shows that MRt*TCi,t-1 
coefficient is the highest for companies with low net worth and declines for high net 
worth companies. The results provide evidence in favour of the broad credit channel 
that low net worth companies are more adversely affected by monetary contractions.  
6.  Conclusion 
This study provides support to Meltzer’s hypothesis that companies substitute trade 
credit for bank credit during restrictive monetary policy period.  The magnitude of this 
substitution in Indian context is statistically significant and as predicted by the theory.  
The empirical results presented in the paper are based on panel data of 828 Indian 
manufacturing companies covering the period from 1990 to 2001. Using panel data 
fixed effect model we estimate the relationships to test the hypothesis.  These results 
assume significance as about 40 per cent and 30 per cent of current assts constitute the   24
trade credit and bank credit respectively.  Both these put together is about 35 per cent 
of total asset of companies in India.  The results also suggest that magnitude of 
substitution also varies depending on the size of company.  The results suggest that low 
net worth companies are worst affected by the monetary restrictions.     25
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List of abbreviations 
AR  Accounts receivable 
AVSALES  Average of net sales (1991-2001) 
CA  Current assets 
CP  Commercial  paper 
CPFD  Commercial paper and fixed deposits 
DEB  Debentures  
FI  Financial institution borrowings 
FOR  Foreign borrowings 
ICICI  Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India 
IDBI  Industrial Development Bank of India 
IFCI  Industrial Finance Corporation of India 
INV  Inventory 
LIQ  Cash plus marketable securities 
MR  Dummy variable for monetary restriction period 
NW  Net worth 
OTHER  Other short term borrowings (excluding CP, TC and STBB) 
PR  Borrowings from company and promoters 
STB  All short-term borrowing (STBB+TC+CP+OTHER) 
STBB  Short-term bank borrowings 
TA  Total assets 
TBB  Total bank borrowings 
TC  Trade credit 
WC  Working capital 
ginv  ∆ Log (INVt) 
invs  Log (INVi ,t-1/Si ,t-1)  
gs  ∆ Log (Si,t) 
liq  LIQi,t-1  
tc  TCi,t-1 
gta  ∆ Log (TAi,t-1) 
rliq  MRt* LIQi,t-1 
rtc  MRt* TCi,t-1   28
lnta  Log (TAi,t-1) 
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Table 1:  Important Indicators: 1991 and 1996 (Rs. in crores) 
 Minimum Maximum  Average  Standard  Deviation 
Variable 1991  1996  1991  1996  1991 1996  1991  1996 
 TBB  0.00  0.00  375.45  1298.55  13.50  39.71  27.67  99.03 
 STBB  0.00  0.00  310.34  715.47  10.26  29.85  21.15  64.09 
 TC  0.00  0.30  498.46  1305.02  16.48  41.57  35.73  99.12 
 TA  1.87  2.36  3398.99  15038.38  96.78  293.16  239.36  850.24 
 INV  0.00  0.00  1172.94  1076.57  24.39  50.16  59.48  101.84 
 AVSALES  10.06  10.06  11699.92  11699.92  225.46  225.46  597.62  597.62 
 TC/STB  0.00  0.05  1.00  1.00  0.55  0.54  0.23  0.21 
 STBBSTB  0.00  0.00  0.99  0.91  0.38  0.41  0.22  0.20 
 TC/TA  0.00  0.01  1.70  1.07  0.21  0.19  0.14  0.13 
 STBB/TA  0.00  0.00  1.24  1.77  0.15  0.15  0.13  0.12 
       
     
Table 2:  Various components of average borrowings (amount in Rs. crores) - 1990-2001 
  TBB FI CPFD  DEB  FOR  PR  OTHER  TC NW WC  INV  AR 
1990  11.56 9.42  2.88  8.95  0.71 0.46  1.77  14.53 23.93 13.62  21.03  12.43 
1991 13.95 12.13  2.97  10.49  0.92  0.59  2.13  17.11  29.07  14.47 25.73 15.08 
1992 16.68 16.83  3.15  13.73  1.53  0.84  2.89  22.18  35.44  19.95 29.26 19.21 
1993 20.46 20.69  3.48  17.16  1.95  0.91  2.89  24.09  47.27  25.57 34.40 24.23 
1994 19.36 22.02  5.45  21.45  2.28  1.52  2.99  28.82  67.15  31.82 35.40 28.58 
1995 28.87 24.45  4.13  22.01  5.03  2.64  3.23  35.26  98.60  41.88 43.94 34.99 
1996 41.35 28.57  3.86  22.00  8.14  2.57  3.75  43.14 122.13 42.79 52.38 43.78 
1997 46.72 34.94  4.91  27.39 14.85  3.60  5.26  47.93 135.96 48.85 54.61 49.31 
1998 51.42 39.15  7.55  33.55 19.80  2.63  7.58  50.92 147.39 50.18 57.19 52.10 
1999 54.41 39.35  10.00  36.76 18.92  3.29  7.82  54.85 151.87 42.50 56.57 52.42 
2000 59.69 39.25  10.16  36.71 12.55  3.30  10.74  61.52 162.74 35.31 62.21 55.39 
2001 60.35 40.00  9.87  39.92 15.28  3.04  8.15  63.57 165.83 30.45 63.28 58.03 
 
Table 3:  Components of borrowings as percent of total borrowing (1990-2001) 
Year TBB FI CPF
D 
DEB FOR PR OTHER  TC INV*  AR* 
1990  27.83 19.74  4.03  7.06  0.31 1.54  3.67  34.41 60.36 39.64 
1991  28.43 20.52  3.71  7.38  0.30 1.53  3.85  32.87 61.09 38.91 
1992  26.77 20.86  3.38  7.95  0.31 1.94  3.68  33.49 59.62 40.38 
1993  27.51 20.77  3.45  8.47  0.31 1.89  3.43  32.34 57.26 42.74 
1994  25.39 20.14  4.75  8.16  0.36 2.38  3.28  33.49 56.37 43.63 
1995  27.25 18.66  3.39  7.68  0.47 2.70  3.11  34.80 56.37 43.63 
1996  29.45 17.80  2.69  6.64  0.56 2.65  3.18  34.99 55.08 44.92 
1997  29.30 16.81  3.07  6.71  0.94 2.83  3.14  34.83 54.07 45.93 
1998  29.34 16.40  3.80  6.94  1.46 2.65  2.79  34.17 53.45 46.55 
1999  28.09 15.97  4.62  7.05  1.43 2.85  2.55  34.82 52.13 47.87 
2000  28.21 14.83  4.35  6.75  0.91 2.71  3.35  36.44 52.44 47.56 
2001  28.89 14.50  4.01  6.46  0.83 2.97  3.27  36.16 52.16 47.84 
Average  28.04 18.08  3.77  7.27  0.68 2.39  3.28  34.40 55.87 44.13 
* INV and AR are per cent of (INV + AR.) 




Table 4:  Components of short-term borrowings as per cent of STB  
Year STBB/STB  CP/STB  OTHER/STB TC/STB 
1990 33.21 0.03  6.95  59.69 
1991 38.68 0.10  6.75  54.36 
1992 38.66 0.20  6.31  54.83 
1993 40.50 0.43  5.91  53.17 
1994 37.65 2.42  5.81  54.11 
1995 39.48 0.59  5.32  54.61 
1996 41.05 0.04  5.36  53.55 
1997 40.76 0.41  5.32  53.51 
1998 40.37 1.20  4.74  53.69 
1999 38.81 1.99  4.49  54.71 
2000 37.68 1.76  5.47  55.10 
2001 38.54 1.64  5.48  54.34 
Average 38.78  0.90  5.66  54.64 
 
Table 5:  Borrowings and inventory a percent of TA - 1990-2001 
Year STBB/TA  TC/TA  OTHER/TA  INV/TA 
1990 14.41  20.90 3.79  36.77 
1991 15.25  20.46 2.53  29.09 
1992 14.79  20.78 2.45  28.31 
1993 15.33  19.57 2.20  27.28 
1994 13.87  18.91 2.02  25.32 
1995 13.87  18.87 1.87  24.58 
1996 14.39  18.90 1.89  23.81 
1997 14.09  18.78 1.89  22.42 
1998 13.86  18.36 1.70  21.40 
1999 13.66  18.56 1.63  20.20 
2000 14.53  19.72 2.27  20.28 
2001 15.66  19.81 2.20  19.85 
Average 14.48  19.47  2.20  24.94 
 
 
Table 6:  Borrowings and inventory as per cent of current assets - 1990-2001 
Year INV/CA  AR/CA  TBB/CA  STBB/CA  TC/CA 
1990  46.02 30.11  32.38 22.07 33.32 
1991  46.05 30.11  31.78 24.58 32.03 
1992  43.99 30.39  28.74 23.33 32.25 
1993  42.61 32.21  29.11 24.49 30.37 
1994  40.54 32.08  27.74 22.63 30.50 
1995  39.84 31.29  62.09 23.01 37.62 
1996  39.90 33.16  30.54 24.86 32.15 
1997  38.99 33.39  32.18 25.71 32.36 
1998  38.15 33.67  35.39 26.80 33.08 
1999  36.93 34.09  36.91 27.68 34.17 
2000  36.78 32.88  38.62 29.76 37.17   31
2001  36.82 33.60  42.65 32.99 39.33 
Average  40.55 32.25  35.68 25.66 33.70 
 
Table 7:  Descriptive statistics of variables used in the study (9108 observations) 
Variables Mean  Std.Dev.  Minimum  Maximum  Skewness 
ginv  ∆ Log (INVt) 0.0931  0.4961  -8.0209  8.0060  0.8123 
invs Log  (INVi ,t-1/Si ,t-1) -1.5810  0.6829  -10.0983  8.0555 -0.6872 
gs  ∆ Log (Si,t) 0.1062  0.3140  -6.7517  7.0205  -0.2988 
liq LIQi,t-1 0.0413  0.0620  0.0000  3.3094  18.5144 
tc TCi,t-1 0.5467  0.2282  0.0000  1.0000  0.2130 
gta  ∆ Log (TAi,t-1) 0.1307  0.2297  -4.0974  3.4844  0.6191 
rliq MRt* LIQi,t-1 0.0083  0.0450  0.0000  3.3094  45.5222 
rtc MRt* TCi,t-1 0.1039  0.2428  0.0000  1.0000  2.2698 
lnta Log  (TAi,t-1) 4.4824  1.3883  0.6043  10.2075  0.4892 
 
Table 8:  Correlation matrix of variables used in the study 
Variables ginv invs  gs  liq  tc  rliq  rtc  gta  lnta 
ginv  1.000           
invs  -0.284  1.000          
gs  0.387 0.121 1.000             
liq  0.044  -0.032 0.096 1.000           
tc  0.043 -0.194 -0.006  0.196  1.000         
rliq  0.067 0.092 0.155 0.628 0.052 1.000       
rtc  0.173  -0.038 0.130 0.050 0.234 0.384 1.000     
gta  0.431  -0.033 0.441 0.099 0.014 0.173 0.133  1.000   
lnta  0.004 0.044 0.031  -0.040  -0.000  -0.044  -0.088  0.066  1.000 
 
Table 9:  Year-wise OLS regression results of 
 
∆ Log (INVt) = λ0 + λ1 Log (INVi ,t-1/Si ,t-1) + λ2 ∆ Log (Si,t) + λ3 LIQi,t-1 + λ4 TCi,t-1 + λ7 Log (TAi,t-1) + λ8 ∆ Log (TAi,t-1) 
Year Constant  invs  gs  liq  tc  lnta  gta  Adj  R
2 F(6,821) 
1991 -1.3662**  -0.7767** 0.7146** 0.8215**  0.0767 0.0425** 0.3534**  0.73  51.31** 
1992 -0.2041**  -0.1367** 0.6175** 0.5412**  -0.1073*  -0.0021 0.4197**  0.47 15.63** 
1993 -0.2479**  -0.0940* 0.4993** 0.5832**  -0.0262  0.0189* 0.4874**  0.41 18.55** 
1994  -0.1372 -0.0798**  0.1706  0.2506  -0.0661 -0.0091  0.7888**  0.29 8.53** 
1995 -0.0511  -0.0654**  0.3236** 0.2183  -0.0398 0.0007  0.4580**  0.28  21.15** 
1996 -0.2384**  -0.0854** 0.1867** 0.6597**  0.0143  0.0147 0.6051**  0.27 18.89** 
1997 -0.1010* -0.0672**  0.2552**  0.2084  -0.0707  -0.0081  0.8068**  0.34  28.84** 
1998 -0.0632 -0.1064*  0.3415* 0.1943 -0.2060*  -0.0141  0.9050**  0.29  7.11** 
1999 -0.2615  -0.1897  0.5439** -0.5703  -0.2261** 0.0049  0.8185**  0.35  8.81** 
2000  -0.1335* -0.0592*  0.4144* 0.0289  -0.0356 0.0066  0.9240**  0.31  9.79** 
2001 -0.0358  -0.0401  0.6127* 0.0441  -0.1118  -0.01 0.8747  0.37  8.92** 
* denotes significance at 5% level   32
** denotes significance at 1% level   33
 
Table 10:  OLS Regression Results of the model all years and all companies 
 
∆ Log (INVt) = λ0 + λ1 Log (INVi ,t-1/Si ,t-1) + λ2 ∆ Log (Si,t) + λ3 LIQi,t-1 + λ4 TCi,t-1  
+ λ5  MRt* TCi,t-1 + λ6 MRt* LIQi,t-1 + λ7 ∆ Log (TAi,t-1) + λ8 Log (TAi,t-1) 
Variables Coefficien
t 
Std. Err.  t-value  Prob 
 constant  -0.3594  0.0197  -18.2420  0.0000 
Log (INVi ,t-1/Si ,t-1) invs  -0.2248  0.0065  -34.7600  0.0000 
∆ Log (Si,t) gs  0.4578  0.0153  29.9820  0.0000 
LIQi,t-1  liq  0.0852 0.0956 0.8920 0.3726 
TCi,t-1  tc  -0.0985 0.0202 -4.8730 0.0000 
MRt* LIQi,t-1  rliq  -0.5209 0.1413 -3.6870 0.0002 
MRt* TCi,t-1 rtc  0.2328  0.0208  11.2000  0.0000 
∆ Log (TAi,t-1) gta  0.6176 0.0209  29.6100  0.0000 
Log (TAi,t-1)  lnta  -0.0004 0.0031 -0.1250 0.9003 
N = 9108  Adj R
2 = 0.3377  F [8, 9099] = 581.45, Prob value = 0.0000 
 
Table 11:  Estimation of Fixed Effect Model: Group Dummy Variables 
Variables Coefficien
t 
Std. Err  t-value  Prob 
Log (INVi ,t-1/Si ,t-1) invs  -0.5239  0.0413  -12.6840  0.0000 
∆ Log (Si,t)  gs  0.5811  0.0552 10.5240 0.0000 
LIQi,t-1 liq  -0.0985  0.1716  -0.5740  0.5661 
TCi,t-1  tc  0.0061 0.0373 0.1640 0.8701 
MRt* LIQi,t-1 rliq  -0.3226  0.1779  -1.8130  0.0699 
MRt* TCi,t-1  rtc  0.1767 0.0210 8.4330 0.0000 
∆ Log (TAi,t-1)  gta  0.5369 0.0723 7.4250 0.0000 
Log (TAi,t-1) lnta  -0.0177  0.0122  -1.4510  0.1469 
N = 9108   Adj R
2 = 0.46105   F [835, 8272] = 10.33, Prob value = 0.0000 
 
Table 12:  Estimation of Fixed Effect Model: Group Means Regression 
Variables Coefficient  Std.  Err.  t-value  Prob 
 constant  0.0540  0.0210  2.5770  0.0100 
Log (INVi ,t-1/Si ,t-1) invs  0.0014  0.0079  0.1720  0.8634 
∆ Log (Si,t) gs  0.5577  0.0507  10.9960  0.0000 
LIQi,t-1 liq  -0.0898  0.1703  -0.5270  0.5980 
TCi,t-1 tc  -0.2672  0.0413  -6.4760  0.0000 
MRt* LIQi,t-1 rliq  -0.6492  0.4523  -1.4350  0.1512 
MRt* TCi,t-1 rtc  1.1982  0.1900  6.3060  0.0000 
∆ Log (TAi,t-1) gta  0.3983  0.0644  6.1860  0.0000 
Log (TAi,t-1) lnta  -0.0088  0.0030  -2.9050  0.0037 
N = 9108    Adj R
2 = 0.3820     F [8, 819] = 64.90, Prob value = 0.0000   34
 
Table 13:  Estimation of Fixed Effect Model: Group Dummy Variables and Period Effects 
 
∆ Log (INVt) = λ0 + λ1 Log (INVi ,t-1/Si ,t-1) + λ2 ∆ Log (Si,t) + λ3 LIQi,t-1 + λ4 TCi,t-1  
+ λ5  MRt* TCi,t-1 + λ6 MRt* LIQi,t-1 + λ7 ∆ Log (TAi,t-1) + λ8 Log (TAi,t-1) 
Variables Coefficient  Std.  Err.  t-value  Prob 
 constant  -1.3061  0.0558  -23.3900  0.0000 
Log (INVi ,t-1/Si ,t-1) invs  -0.5316  0.0089 -59.9940 0.0000 
∆ Log (Si,t) gs  0.5739  0.0145  39.6480  0.0000 
LIQi,t-1 liq  -0.1384  0.1044  -1.3250  0.1852 
TCi,t-1 tc  -0.0285  0.0282  -1.0130  0.3112 
MRt* LIQi,t-1 rliq  -0.1612  0.1358  -1.1870  0.2353 
MRt* TCi,t-1 rtc  0.3393  0.0433  7.8400  0.0000 
∆ Log (TAi,t-1) gta  0.4539  0.0212  21.4040  0.0000 
Log (TAi,t-1) lnta  0.0950  0.0117  8.1480  0.0000 
 
N = 9108    Adj R





Table 14:  Estimation of Random Effect Model 
  
∆ Log (INVt) = λ0 + λ1 Log (INVi ,t-1/Si ,t-1) + λ2 ∆ Log (Si,t) + λ3 LIQi,t-1 + λ4 TCi,t-1  
+ λ5  MRt* TCi,t-1 + λ6 MRt* LIQi,t-1 + λ7 ∆ Log (TAi,t-1) + λ8 Log (TAi,t-1) 
Variables Coefficient  Std.  Err.  t-value  Prob 
 constant  -0.9318  0.0463  -20.1120  0.0000 
Log (INVi ,t-1/Si ,t-1) invs  -0.4635  0.0083  -55.9990  0.0000 
∆ Log (Si,t) gs  0.5487  0.0143  38.2360  0.0000 
LIQi,t-1 liq -0.0731  0.1016  -0.7200  0.4716 
TCi,t-1 tc -0.0687  0.0263  -2.6150  0.0089 
MRt* LIQi,t-1 rliq  -0.2406  0.1345  -1.7890  0.0736 
MRt* TCi,t-1  rtc  0.3633 0.0408 8.9060 0.0000 
∆ Log (TAi,t-1) gta  0.5039  0.0207  24.3430  0.0000 
Log (TAi,t-1)  lnta  0.0386 0.0071 5.4290 0.0000 
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Table 15:  Estimation of fixed effect model sample classified  
size of net worth group dummy variables and period effects 
 
 
Group 1: Adj R
2 = 0.6125    F [224,2052] = 17.06  Prob = 
0.0000 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Err.  t-value  Prob 
constant -1.5426  0.1001  -15.4160  0.0000 
Log (INVi ,t-1/Si ,t-1)  -0.5140 0.0161  -31.9130 0.0000 
∆ Log (Si,t)  0.4758 0.0247 19.2700 0.0000 
LIQi,t-1  -0.3467 0.2848 -1.2180 0.2234 
TCi,t-1  -0.0262 0.0656 -0.4000 0.6893 
MRt* LIQi,t-1  -0.8458 0.5129 -1.6490 0.0992 
MRt* TCi,t-1  0.5749 0.0980  5.8660 0.0000 
∆ Log (TAi,t-1)  0.9982 0.0473 21.1030 0.0000 
Log (TAi,t-1)  0.1958 0.0284  6.8830 0.0000 
 
Group 2: Adj R
2 = 0.4270    F [224, 2052] = 8.57  Prob = 
0.0000 
constant -1.2744  0.1056  -12.0640  0.0000 
Log (INVi ,t-1/Si ,t-1)  -0.5499 0.0188  -29.1980 0.0000 
∆ Log (Si,t)  0.6046 0.0313 19.3040 0.0000 
LIQi,t-1  0.2821 0.1944  1.4510 0.1467 
TCi,t-1  -0.1237 0.0513 -2.4140 0.0158 
MRt* LIQi,t-1  0.1115 0.3261  0.3420 0.7324 
MRt* TCi,t-1  0.3689 0.0819  4.5030 0.0000 
∆ Log (TAi,t-1)  0.2603 0.0417  6.2380 0.0000 
Log (TAi,t-1)  0.1086 0.0251  4.3310 0.0000 
 
Group 3: Adj R
2 = 0.3403    F [224, 2052] = 6.24  Prob = 
0.0000 
constant -0.8676  0.1304  -6.6520  0.0000 
Log (INVi ,t-1/Si ,t-1)  -0.3999 0.0181  -22.1270 0.0000 
∆ Log (Si,t)  0.4615 0.0301 15.3130 0.0000 
LIQi,t-1  -0.3707 0.1940 -1.9110 0.0560 
TCi,t-1  0.0432 0.0525  0.8220 0.4111 
MRt* LIQi,t-1  0.2259 0.4128  0.5470 0.5841 
MRt* TCi,t-1  0.2264 0.0834  2.7140 0.0066 
∆ Log (TAi,t-1)  0.2718 0.0422  6.4370 0.0000 
Log (TAi,t-1)  0.0489 0.0264  1.8530 0.0639 
 
Group 4: Adj R
2 = 0.5035    F [224,2052] = 11.30  Prob = 
0.0000 
constant -1.6003  0.1238  -12.9260  0.0000 
Log (INVi ,t-1/Si ,t-1)  -0.7026 0.0181  -38.8540 0.0000 
∆ Log (Si,t)  0.6765 0.0350 19.3150 0.0000 
LIQi,t-1  -0.1279 0.1648 -0.7760 0.4376 
TCi,t-1  -0.0454 0.0500 -0.9080 0.3641   36
MRt* LIQi,t-1  0.0725 0.1859  0.3900 0.6966 
MRt* TCi,t-1  0.1508 0.0751  2.0070 0.0447 
∆ Log (TAi,t-1)  0.2092 0.0361  5.8030 0.0000 
Log (TAi,t-1)  0.0787 0.0191  4.1240 0.0000 
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Appendix 1 
During the pre-reform period the monetary policy was highly regulated.  Following 
the Narasimham Committee Recommendations there have been a number of financial 
sector reforms towards liberalising the money market and banking sector in India.  
With the reduction in cash reserve ratio (CRR) and statutory liquidity ratio (SLR), the 
liquidity position of commercial banks has significantly enhanced.  The bank rate has 
become an anchor to signal the direction of interest rates.  With these reforms the 
interest rates have eased.  Since 1992 the interest rates have shown a downward trend. 
Although the trend towards deregulation was visible during 1991-92 to 1995-96 
periods, the years 1996-97 and 1997-1998 witnessed the beginning of a sharp turning 
point in the monetary policy regime in India, resulting in a trend of significantly 
comfortable liquidity conditions and declining interest rates. 
Reduction in the nominal interest rates, however, has accompanied by a fall in 
inflation rates. In real terms, the prime lending rate (PLR) was higher during the period 
1995-96 to 2001-02, as compared to the PLR prevailing during the period 1990-91 to 
1994-95.  The table below indicates this. 
Lending Rates: Nominal and Real (%) 
Year  PLR Nominal  PLR Real  Inflation 
March 1991  16.00  7.05  8.36 
March 1992  19.00  6.83  11.39 
March 1993  17.00  5.54  10.86 
March 1994  14.00  5.79  7.76 
March 1995  15.00  2.51  12.18 
March 1996  16.50  7.25  8.62 
March 1997  14.50  12.13  2.11 
March 1998  14.00  10.83  2.86 
March 1999  12.50  7.81  4.35 
March 2000  12.25  9.25  2.75 
March 2001  11.50  8.01  3.23 
March 2002  11.50  9.47  1.85 
Real interest rates (i) have been calculated after adjusting the 
nominal interest rates (r) for inflation rate (η) using the 
equation  (1+i)(1+ η) = (1+r) 
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The following table shows the average real lending rates of financial institutions and 
scheduled commercial banks prevailing during the 1990-91 to 1994-95 periods and the 
1995-96 to 2001-02 periods. 
Average Real Lending Rates (%) 
Institution  1990-91 to1994-95  1995-96 to 2001-02 
IDBI 5.52  9.11 
IFCI 5.82  9.99 
ICICI 5.67  8.38 
SCBs 6.80  12.50 
* Source: Report on Currency and Finance, 2001-2002 
 
As it is evident from above tables, the years 1996-97 and 1997-98 witnessed significant 
softening of lending rates, but only in nominal terms. The situation is just the reverse 
when interest rates are examined in real terms. The following classification can be 
made based on average real lending rates: 
·  The 5-year period beginning from 1990-91 to1994-95. This denotes the period 
when real interest rates were low.  
·  The 5-year period beginning from 1995-96 to 2001-02. This denotes the period 
when real interest rates were comparatively higher.  
Restrictive Years 
It is difficult to clearly identify the stance of monetary policy with a single indicator. 
Hence, neither bank rate, nor lending rate, nor the interest rate spreads were used 
individually as parameters to identify the restrictive years. Instead, we have used the 
Economic Survey as a base to identify the restrictive years. Beginning from 1991 to 
2001, two years have been clearly identified as restrictive years.  These years are 1991-
92 and 1996-97.  For example, the Economic Survey of 1992 states that the stance of 
monetary policy in 1991-92 was restrictive to contain the growth of aggregate demand 
to fight the twin problems of high inflation and adverse balance of payments.  The 
discussion in Economic Survey also suggests the following policy changes in monetary 
policy during the period:   39
·  Bank rate was revised twice and was raised from 10 per cent to 12 per cent. 
·  Interest rates on term deposits (particularly short-term deposits) were raised 
significantly. 
·  Interest rates on bank advances of all categories underwent upward revision. 
·  The credit policy of the RBI in the first half of the financial year 1991-92 
announced incremental cash reserve ratio (CRR) as an instrument for credit 
control, which was introduced with effect from 4 May 1991. 
·  The credit policy for the second half of the financial year (announcement date 8 
October 1991) also had the same stance of restraint in the growth of money 
supply. 
·  Upward revisions were made in the lending rates of scheduled commercial banks 
(SCBs). 
·  Net bank credit to the government and bank credit to the commercial sector 
recorded lower growth rate of 17.1 per cent and 4.8 per cent respectively during 
1991-92 (up to 10 January 1992), as against 17.6 per cent and  7.8 per cent 
respectively in the corresponding period of 1990-91.  
·  The net increase in RBI credit to the Central Government has been of a lower 
order in 1991-92 than in the last financial year. 
  
The year of 1996-97 has also been described as a period of restrictive monetary policy.  
The Economic Survey states that during 1996-1997 the bank lending rates remained 
sticky for sometime despite the increased liquidity with the banks following CRR 
reductions. Banks did not reduce interest rates immediately in order to avoid a dent in 
the interest rate spread that would have affected profits adversely. With inflation falling 
sharply, real interest rates rose, contributing to lower demand for credit.  Though 
nominal interest rates fell during the 1996-97 period, real interest rates rose during this 
period because of falling inflation rates. 
 